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The interdisciplinary research related to common resources has become extremely 
important, because commons are a very complex theme and in fact they need the 
contribution of several areas of knowledge. 
Commons have long been a central theme in the environmental problems, such as the 
global environmental changes or overfishing. “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968) 
is a reference in this area. There are also many comedies on commons, as well (see, for 
example, Dietz et al, 2002). These authors explain why sometimes there are dramas on 
commons (not just tragedies but also comedies). Agrawal (2002) presents some 
conditions to a sustainable management on commons, as well.  
In order to find out solutions to the problem of resources, cooperation has been seen 
as an interesting way to reach good results in commons exploitation area. We'll show 
how cooperation, in general, is important to avoid tragedies and how it may contribute to 
implement conservative practices.  
In the international cooperation field or in the processes of decision making the 
institutions which deal with these matters got very important. Cooperation on institutions 
that manage the commons can be observed in Richerson et al, 2002.   
Studies about cooperation on fishing area were made, for example, by Gronbaek 
(2000), who studies a cooperative and a non-cooperative solution in fishing field and 
formalizes mathematically a sustainable cooperative solution. Munro (2002) presents 
some interesting cases of cooperation on fishing area.  Miller and Munro (2002) shows 
that cooperation, in general, is important and that non-cooperative fisheries normally lead 




We'll study the effects of cooperation between two Portuguese fishing producers’ 
organizations (POs). Names of POs will be omitted to keep the confidentiality of these 
organizations. We'll express their relationship with national fishing Portuguese 
authorities, as well.  
Our model gives a view of benefits of cooperation to the members of this kind of 
organizations and gives a view of the advantages of cooperation for the conservation of 
Portuguese sardine stocks, which are included in those stocks that we call Ibero-Atlantic 
stocks. Generally, this allows us to analyze the effects of cooperation on the study of the 
problem known as the “Drama of the Commons”.  
Cournot-Nash Model 
General Remarks 
We aim to study sardine fisheries by using economic theory of Cournot oligopoly 
and by using Nash equilibrium, combining both approaches. 
Levhari and Mirman (1980) have presented an example using a dynamic Cournot-
Nash solution for fish wars and it has become a reference for fishing games.  
We have considered an original variable for this kind of models (fishing effort), in 
order to study the efficiency of the inputs used in sardine fisheries in Portuguese waters.  
In fact, our Cournot model and the consequent Cournot-Nash equilibrium will allow 
us to analyze the contribution of cooperation for the preservation of sardine in Portuguese 
waters and it will allow us to analyze its contribution for the stabilization of fishers’ rents. 
The Basic Model   
The usual model (an oligopoly model) allows us to determine simultaneously the 




which members produce a homogeneous product (sardine). Sardine catches are the 
quantities (q) used in the traditional Cournot model. 
When we consider two POs, producing sardine (considered here as a homogeneous 
product) and selling it in the same market, they will try to maximize their own profits 
(their own rewards in the game). This profit is given by the difference between sales and 
costs. Each one reward function (or profit function) is given by:  
11211 ),( CTRTqq −=π  (1) 
22212 ),( CTRTqq −=π  (2) 
In these equations πi, RTi and CTi are respectively profit, total sales and total cost for POi 
and i = 1, 2. Sales function of each one of both POs results from applying a price to the 
quantity sold by a PO and it is given by:  
[ ] 2121112111 *)(*)( qbqbqAqqqqbAqqpRT −−=+−==  (3) 
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and p(q) is the market price as a function of quantities q. The quantity q is the total 
quantity produced and sold in the market (i.e., q = q1+ q2). A and b are constant values 
and q1 e q2 are the quantities produced and sold respectively by PO1 and by PO2. 
POs costs are 
11 cqCT =  (5) 
22 cqCT =  (6) 
and c is a constant (c>0). We consider here that both POs have the same costs (and 
consequently c has the same value for both POs). However, this proceeding is not a 
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and qie represents the quantity produced by POi, which is its expected production. 
Those are the quantities that allow us to maximize the profit for each one of both POs, 
given the expected production for each other's competitor in the market. As this is a 
simultaneous game, each PO makes its own decision about production but it does not 
know which will be the decision of its competitor in the market. In each one's process of 
decision, each PO will just use the expected value for the production of its competitor in 
the market. The equations 11 and 12 will be precisely the reaction functions for PO1 and 
PO2. Each one will choose the quantity that maximizes its own profits (given the 




correspond to the best reaction that this PO expects will be the choice made by its 
competitor. 
A Nash equilibrium is a solution in which the players strategies represent the best 
answers one to each other, reciprocally. So, in this model, q1 = q1e and q2 = q2e. This 
means that the quantity that PO1 has produced represents the quantity that PO2 expected 
PO1 would produce. This is the strategy followed by PO1. The same procedure happens 


















So, q1* and q2* are the values that represent the Nash equilibrium. In this solution, no PO 
has any incentives to change its own solution, because these ones are the best strategies, 
each one for each PO. Both POs follow their best strategies that correspond to the best 
responses to the strategy followed by its competitor in the market. This is the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for both POs. 
For more than two POs, we can use the same philosophy for the analysis. If there is a 
large number of POs, Cournot model represent a competitive model where we have n 




















represents the total 




jq  represents the sum of 
























As products are homogeneous and marginal costs of each one of all POs are the same and 
equal to c, we'll have the same share of the market for each one of all POs. All of them 
produce the same quantity. As a result, we'll have qi = qj for all j and i
n
ij
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cAnnqq i  
(21) 
If n comes close to infinity, this last expression comes close to 1. This means that when 
there are a large number of POs in the market, we'll have 
b
cAq −= . We also know that 
in a competitive market, each PO will produce until the market price comes to the level 
of marginal cost. This fact explains the reasons why we have similar results through the 
Cournot model and through a model of a complete competitive market.  
If there is cooperation between POs (n = 2), we'll have a collusion solution. Now, 
we'll have the sum of both profit functions to get the total profit for the collusion. So, we 
have now: 
21 πππ +=T  (22) 

















We'll have now a solution for POs collusion. The optimal quantities result from both POs 
collusion. These quantities will assure major profits for the collusion. The consequent 
results will show that the final global profit is expected to be better than the old situation 
and one PO or both may improve their own situation. This means that, in an extreme 
situation, one PO may rest in a worse situation, although the global situation is always 
better than the solution without cooperation. So, sometimes it is possible to negotiate and 




than before. Besides, we can expect that prices will increase and quantities will decrease 
under cooperation.  
 
The New Model 
Cournot model is a model of quantities. In the usual fishing theories, there is a 
variable representing quantities that has a formal relationship with fishing effort. In fact, 
there is an obvious relationship between fishing effort and catches of fish. Catches 
represent the production of fish (q). In our model, we replace this variable (quantities) by 
another variable, related to that one, what represents precisely the fishing effort (E). Our 
aim is to analyze if there is a direct relationship between fishing effort and cooperation, in 
order to study if lower levels for fishing effort induce more conservative politics for 
species, more sustainable resources and better rents for fishers in the long term, as well. 
So, the usual equations 
iii CTRTqq −=),( 21π  (24) 
 (i = 1, 2) are replaced in the model by the equations 
iii CTRTEE −=),( 21π  (25) 
 (i = 1, 2). We have qi as a function of Ei and X. In fact, qi = f (Ei,X) and represents the 
produced quantity (i.e, catches), Ei is the fishing effort used by POi, X is the biomass 
level for sardine and πi, RTi and CTi are respectively profit, total sales and total cost for 
POi, as before. We'll have now the following functions for sales:  
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[ ] ),()),(),(()(*)( 22122 XEfXEfXEfbAEqqpRT +−==  (28) 
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22122 ),(),(),(),( XEbfXEfXEbfXEAfRT −−=  (29) 
Besides, PO costs are given by CT1 = cE1 and CT2 = cE2, in which c is a constant (c>0). 
We consider, as before, the same costs (c) for each PO. As we have already seen, this 
proceeding is not a necessary requirement for the analysis. 
Now, we'll formalize the model in order to solve the mathematical problem through 




















Now, we'll get the optimal values for E1 and E2. Additionally, eii EE =  represents the 
level for fishing effort expected by POj for POi ( ji ≠ , i, j = 1, 2). The solution *iE   
(i = 1, 2) represents the optimal fishing effort for POi. These levels will maximize 
individual rents for POs, in a competition basis and represent the optimal levels for 
fishing effort, those that maximize rents for each PO, knowing previously the expected 
level for its competitor's fishing effort in the market. As this is a simultaneous game, each 
PO makes its own decision about its fishing effort that it will apply to the fishery, but it 
does not know the decision that is made by its rival in the market. So, each company just 
considers the expected level of fishing effort for its competitor in the market. 
Consequently, we'll know the reaction functions for each PO and, as it was already seen, 
we will determine the fishing effort level that maximizes rents for each PO, given the 




level represents the best response to the decision made by its competitor in the market. 
Such a decision, made by one PO, represents the decision its competitor would expect 
this PO would make about fishing effort. Consequently, without cooperation, the solution 
for the problem is a Nash equilibrium solution and it is the best solution *iE . In this level 
for fishing effort, no PO has any advantages to change its own strategy in the game 
because this is the best level of fishing effort and it represents its best strategy. 
Now, we'll consider that both POs cooperate and that they make arrangements in 
order to get benefits from the collusion between them.  Now, both POs will maximize 
aggregate rents, instead maximizing their own rents, individually. That is the goal. In 
order to see this, consider now 
21 πππ +=T  (32) 
To maximize the aggregate profit we'll have a solution (the collusion solution) from the 

















In the solution for this problem, aggregate fishing effort is expected to reach a lower level 
than the sum of the reached levels for each individual solution. This is consistent with 
benefits expected for the members of POs, because costs of fishing are expected to be 
lower. As an additional result, it is expected that the market price would be higher and the 
aggregate rent would be higher, as well. Besides, as the aggregate fishing effort is 




consequently, we'll expect to get a stock's management more compatible with 
conservative objectives. 
In practice, we have analyzed two POs in Portugal, representative in sardine 
Portuguese market, which members are competing in the same market and producing a 
homogeneous product (sardine). In short, both POs exploit Portuguese Sardine Stock and 
they sell it in the local market.  
The geographical limits for Sardina Pilchardus Walbaum in which Portuguese 
Sardine is included are, in the North, the frontier between France and Spain and, in the 
South, Gibraltar. This area corresponds to the VIIIc and IXa divisions of ICES (see 
annexed figure 1). 
Biological factors for sardine abundance  
The abundance of sardine rests very dependent of sardine recruits entering on fishing 
biomass. Analyzing the period since the middle of 1990s, we can note that years 2000 
and 2001 had very strong recruitment processes, particularly the first one of these years, 
due to several factors (biologic, fishing effort and others) - see annexed figure 2. Besides, 
analyzing stock spawning biomass (SSB), we can see that there were very good levels for 
SSB in the last years of the series. SSB grew up since 2000 until 2003 and high levels for 
SSB have been maintained since then - see annexed figure 3. It seems that there has been 
a good reproduction capacity for this specie and there has been a good evolution for 
sardine Portuguese stocks - see annexed figure 4, as well. 
The Importance of Agents Cooperation for Sardine Stocks and Fishers’ Rents 
Due to the existing agreements between the two POs and between POs and 




 In addition POs have promoted some measures to reduce catches and to organize 
markets, preserving species for the future generations and protecting fishing present 
interests. POs have well controlled the activity of fishers and controlled catches. Catches 
levels have decreased and fishers’ rents have benefited from good POs management 
practice and from the existing cooperation between POs (but also from the cooperation 
between POs and fishing authorities).  
Sardine prices have sustainably increased (Figure 6) and catches were already kept in 
high levels (figure 7). However POs implemented important measures to reduce fishing 




The conclusions of our model seem to be well understood by all stakeholders of 
fishing sector and, consequently, communication between all the agents seems to become 
easier. 
Many factors for cooperation have been required and consequently they have been 
promoted. Therefore, the relationship between local POs and national DGPA (national 
authority that rules the fishing sector) has become more profitable and good results got 
evident. 
Thus, programs of exploitation of Portuguese sardine have had interesting results and 
brought a sustainable rents policy for all the sector’s agents, since they are involved and 




As we can see, cooperation promote a reduction in catches but prices are kept at high 
levels and rents are assured. In fact, this model shows that cooperation can be well 
understood by stakeholders of fishing sector and it proves that there are great benefits, 
through just a simple way of managing fisheries. Theory of games has become important 
to analyze the way how natural resources are exploited and allows an integrated but 
simple model to analyze the decision making process on politics fishing area and, 
particularly, on fishing practices.  
Conclusion 
Cournot-Nash model contributes to see that cooperation is important to the preservation 
of species and to the preservation of fishers’ rents in the long term and to the socio-
economic stability of coastal communities.  
Our study also permits to conclude that there is a good management of sardine stocks in 
Portuguese waters and that there is a sustainable exploitation for this resource in the long 
term. 
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Sardine Recruitment, in Billions of Recruits (age 0), 







































Sardine Stock Spawning Biomass (SSB), in Thousands Tons,  













































Sardine Biomass in Portuguese Waters,  
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